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DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/MB

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Dear Mr. [REDACTED]

I am sending you for your guidance in connection with your meeting with Khrushchev tomorrow, copies of the most recent communications between the President and Khrushchev.

We have just had a talk about your meeting tomorrow, in the NSC Executive Committee, and the following points represent the most useful guidance for that discussion.

1. For the moment, we should continue on our present course, which is to get Soviet assurances the U.S.'s will be withdrawn in a limited period in return for which we would be prepared to lift quarantine.

we would much prefer to settle the bomber-question ~~now~~ before going on to other matters.

2. The President will be having a press conference on Tuesday. He should point out to Khrushchev the difficult position in which the President will find himself if he has to formulate a public statement to the American people in the absence of Soviet agreement to get the bombers out of Cuba.

The Honorable

John F. Kennedy,

United States Mission to the United Nations,

770 W. Plaza,

New York, New York.

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5. The letter which Alist Stevenson suggested might be sent to Eisenhower is an admirably clear statement of the U.S. position and you may want use the substance of it in your discussion. We gave over it more, and done a little editing which is reflected in the copy I am attaching to this for your convenience. However, we think it would best to await the results of your Sunday talking with Eisenhower, and the Soviet reply on the XI-20's before writing Eisenhower a formal bargaining letter.

Good luck with your talk, and let us know as soon as you can of any shifts you perceive in the Soviet position, particularly on the XI-20's.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk

Copy to: Alist. Stevenson

10:13:22

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**TRANSCRIBED PAGES FOLLOW**

Dear John:

I am sending you for your guidance in connection with your meeting with Kuznetsov tomorrow, copies of the most recent communications between the President and Khrushchev.

We have just had a talk about your meeting tomorrow, in the NSC Executive Committee, and the following points represent the most useful guidance for that discussion.

1. For the moment, we should continue on the present course, which is to get Soviet assurances that the IL-28's will be withdrawn in a limited period of time in return for which we would be prepared to lift the quarantine.

[Excised]

we would much prefer to settle the bomber-quarantine deal before going on to other matters.

2. The President will be having a press conference on Tuesday. You should point out to Kuznetsov the difficult position in which the President will find himself if he has to formulate a public statement to the American people in the absence of Soviet agreement to get the bombers out of Cuba.

The Honorable

John J. McCloy

United States Mission to the United Nations

799 UN Plaza

New York, New York

[Excised]

5. The letter which Adlai Stevenson suggested might be sent to Khrushchev is an admirably clear statement of the U.S. position and you may want to use the substance of it in your discussion. We have gone over it here and done a little editing which is reflected in the copy I am attaching to this [ ? ] for your convenience. However, we think it would be best to await the results of your Sunday walking and talking with Kuznetsov, and the Soviet reply on the IL-28's before writing Kuznetsov a formal bargaining letter.

Good luck with your talk, and let me know as soon as you can of any shift you perceive in the Soviet position, particularly on the IL-28's.

With warm regards.

Sincerely,

Dean Rusk